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INTRODUCTION
In many public institutions in Australia, it is customary to begin a public
occasion with a form of acknowledgement of “country.” At the Law School of
University of Melbourne in Melbourne, Victoria, one of the protocols takes the
form: “We/I acknowledge the Traditional Owners of the land in which this event
is taking place, the land of the Wurundjeri and pay respect to their Elders and
families.”1 This protocol is interesting for a number of reasons, not the least of
them being the way in which it offers a form of acknowledgment of a relationship

* Associate Professor, Melbourne Law School, University of Melbourne. I would like to thank Chris
Tomlins for his generosity in initiating and hosting the “Law As . . .” II symposium in February 2012.
This Essay draws on, and continues arguments and material developed in, a long-term collaboration
with Shaunnagh Dorsett of the Faculty of Law, University of Technology, Sydney. In addition to
thanking Shaunnagh Dorsett, I would also like to acknowledge with thanks the contributions to this
Essay made by Olivia Barr, Christine Black, Ann Genovese, Jeff Malpas, Jeffrey Minson, Ed
Mussawir, Sundhya Pahuja, Kim Rubenstein, and Peter Rush. Constantin Fasolt provided a generous
commentary on a version of this Essay at the “Law As . . .” II symposium. I would also like to thank
the editors of the UC Irvine Law Review for their editorial work.
1. Univ. of Melbourne, Aboriginal Cultural Protocols Guidelines, MURRUP BARAK, MELB. INST.
FOR INDIGENOUS DEV., http://www.murrupbarak.unimelb.edu.au/files/miip/Cultural_Protocols
_University_Council%20(Final).pdf (last visited Mar. 2, 2013).
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between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples in Australia.2 What is also
interesting is the way that the protocol suggests, but does not make explicit, that
what is being acknowledged is the meeting of Indigenous and non-Indigenous
laws. By referring to the Wurundjeri people as “traditional owners,” Indigenous
laws are acknowledged as laws of the past but are treated only as tradition in the
laws of the present. “Settler” and “postcolonial” nation-states continue to struggle
to create political and juridical forms adequate to the demands of the conduct of
relations between non-Indigenous and Indigenous peoples.3
From within the common law tradition, this Article addresses two related
aspects of the engagement of laws: one relating to the conduct and quality of the
meeting of laws, and the other relating to the ways in which responsibility for the
conduct of law is expressed by jurisprudents. The conduct of lawful relations, or
ways of belonging to law, addressed in this Article are those made available in the
work of repatriation and the repatriation of the Indigenous dead from the
museums and universities of Europe and North America to Aboriginal
(Indigenous) peoples and nations in Australia.4
For differing reasons, the burial of the dead is important both to Indigenous
and non-Indigenous relations of law. The contemporary engagement of the
repatriation of the Indigenous dead held in museums, universities, and state
institutions has a recent history dating back around forty years. Within traditions
of Western law, the concerns of repatriation have generally arisen as matters of the
conduct of war and the practice of religious ceremony.5 For those who live with
the common law tradition, the contemporary concerns of repatriation are often
viewed as part of a necessary political and ethical response to the wrongs of the
dispossession of Indigenous peoples. In this context, repatriation might be
considered a part of the work of restitution and reconciliation. The point of
engagement in this Essay, however, lies more directly in the conduct of lawful
relations (of ways of belonging to law) than with the remedying of injustice and
the redemptive possibilities of repatriation. It addresses the continuing juridical
importance of the repatriation of the Indigenous dead as part of a meeting of laws.

2. In general, I have chosen to capitalize the term “Indigenous” when it refers to the
indigenous peoples of Australia. Whilst there is no generally agreed protocol in Australia, the colonial
and postcolonial practice of naming the diverse peoples and nations that inhabit what is now Australia
as aboriginal or indigenous means that their specific national and juridical existence is not
acknowledged. Since the consequences of this refusal to acknowledge laws and peoples is a central
concern of this Essay, it seems appropriate to draw attention to this situation.
3. See generally LAW AND POLITICS IN BRITISH COLONIAL THOUGHT: TRANSPOSITIONS OF
EMPIRE (Shaunnagh Dorsett & Ian Hunter eds., 2010).
4. The terminology of “old people,” “Indigenous dead,” “ancestral remains,” “human
remains,” “cultural items,” or “body parts” varies with subject matter, context, and sense of
responsibility. I have generally used “Indigenous dead” to indicate that it is the dead and the place and
placement of the dead that is at issue. I indicate specific uses as relevant.
5. See generally Ernst H. Kantorowicz, Pro Patria Mori in Medieval Political Thought, 56 AM. HIST.
REV. 472 (1951).
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Accordingly, repatriation is addressed here in terms of the return of the dead to
their proper law and jurisdiction.
The narrative of this Article runs from the concern with repatriation to the
conduct of the meeting of laws and on to the forms of responsibility for the
conduct of lawful relations. What is addressed, or what is followed, in this account
is the lawful passing of the dead from one jurisdiction to another. Jurisdiction is
understood here in terms both of the formal ordering of authority and of the
authorisation or crafting of lawful relations.6 The practice of jurisdiction is
concerned with authority to act as well as with the repertoires or forms of conduct
taken up through its exercise. Such practices are, in short, the technical means by
which a conduct of lawful relations is given shape.7 In this Article, the practices of
jurisdiction that engage the meeting of laws are treated as being more or less
nonreflective and nonreflexive. They are not addressed here either as reflecting
broader social relations or as a point of critical reflection and transformation. The
reason for restricting the scope of enquiry in this way is to draw out the particular
forms of responsibility practiced in the repatriation of the Indigenous dead. In
doing so, it also offers an account of the jurisprudence or conduct of lawful
relations expressed through the technical (and empirical) forms of jurisdictional
practice. This account, in turn, is shaped by the sense that it is meaningful to have
a sense of honour or shame about the conduct of lawful relations within the
common law tradition.8
I. REPATRIATION AND THE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF LAWS
Repatriation is more a term of political engagement than of legal art—its
current usage relates without much doctrinal unity to the return of the military
dead from the battlefield, to the return of refugees and stateless peoples, and to
the return of the human and cultural remains of the Indigenous dead from the
museums, hospitals, and other institutions of colonial and former colonial powers.
In general, these concerns are linked with the maintenance of the patria or the
nation.
The Indigenous dead were systematically disinterred, looted, and collected
more or less from the moment of the British claim of sovereign possession and
settlement in Australia from the 1790s through the 1930s and beyond. The
experience of Indigenous peoples in Australia in this respect follows a familiar
pattern of nineteenth-century British, European, and American political, military,
and scientific expropriation of land and life.9

6.
7.

SHAUNNAGH DORSETT & SHAUN MCVEIGH, JURISDICTION 10–29 (2012).
Mariana Valverde, Jurisdiction and Scale: Legal ‘Technicalities’ as Resources for Theory, 18 SOC. &
LEGAL STUD. 139, 144–46 (2009).
8. RAIMOND GAITA, A COMMON HUMANITY: THINKING ABOUT LOVE AND TRUTH AND
JUSTICE 87–106 (Routledge 2d ed. 2000) (1998).
9. See TOM GRIFFITHS, HUNTERS AND COLLECTORS: THE ANTIQUARIAN IMAGINATION IN
AUSTRALIA 58–59 (1996).

474

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4:471

In Australia, it is Indigenous peoples and groups that have largely initiated
the movement for repatriation. In the 1980s, organisations like the Foundation for
Aboriginal and Islander Research Action (FAIRA) and the Tasmanian Aboriginal
Centre (TAC) became important in advocating for repatriation. Considerable
impetus for repatriation has also been generated from within the museums and
universities in Australia, the United States of America, and Europe.10
The work of repatriation engaged by Indigenous peoples has been addressed
in many different contexts. Henry Atkinson, a Yorta Yorta elder, has pointed out
that in matters of repatriation the concerns of Aboriginal people lie directly with
the dead rather than with human remains as such.11 In The Land Is the Source of the
Law, the jurisprudent Christine Black of the Kombumerri and Munaljarli peoples
draws out the sense in which the relationship between the living, the dead, and the
yet to be born might be addressed within an Indigenous jurisprudence.12 This
understanding sets repatriation within an Indigenous cosmology, a law of
relationship, and an account of (human) rights and responsibilities. The question
of the dispossession and repatriation of the Indigenous dead is addressed both in
terms of a relation between the living and the dead and in terms of the way that
you and your kin are patterned into the land. This patterning is concerned with the
ecology of the law of relationship: the balance through which the dyadic
relationship to the land (cosmos) is maintained and the ways in which rights and
responsibilities of humans are realized.13 The removal of people—the dead, the
living, and the yet to be born—from their land is a disruption of the cosmic
ordering of the land and of the modes of its governance.14 As Black points out,
the remedy for this lies with an appropriate response to the lawful relationship
with the land.15 From this viewpoint, the national and international laws of the
common law tradition take on value in so far as they can be patterned into an
Indigenous law.
Christine Black also offers a blunt epitome of relations between Indigenous
and non-Indigenous laws as that of a “full law” to a “half law.”16 The rights and
responsibilities that engage indigenous jurisprudences, Black notes, are not
organised in terms of the interests of state sovereignty or common humanity so

10. See TIFFANY JENKINS, CONTESTING HUMAN REMAINS IN MUSEUM COLLECTIONS: THE
CRISIS OF CULTURAL AUTHORITY 1–2 (2011).
11. Henry Atkinson, The Meanings and Values of Repatriation, in THE LONG WAY HOME: THE
MEANING AND VALUES OF REPATRIATION 15, 18 (Paul Turnbull & Michael Pickering eds., 2010)
[hereinafter THE LONG WAY HOME]; see also Franchesca Cubillo, Repatriating Our Ancestors: Who Will
Speak for the Dead?, in THE LONG WAY HOME, supra, at 20, 20.
12. C. F. BLACK, THE LAND IS THE SOURCE OF THE LAW: A DIALOGIC ENCOUNTER WITH
INDIGENOUS JURISPRUDENCE 3 (2011).
13. Id. at 15–16.
14. Id. at 107.
15. Id. at 109.
16. Christine Morris, Constitutional Dreaming, in BEYOND THE REPUBLIC: MEETING GLOBAL
CHALLENGES TO CONSTITUTIONALISM 290, 291 (Charles Sampford & Tom Round eds., 2001)
(Christine Morris has since changed her name to Christine Black).
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much as engagements and actualisations of a full cosmology and law of
relationship.17 The “half law” of Western, state-based jurisprudences is organised
in terms of an assemblage of limited jurisdictions that suspend judgment on full
cosmological accounts of law, and that judge by reference to limited forms of
authority and responsibility.18 As a consequence, Indigenous jurisprudences do
not usually relate to Western jurisprudences in terms of the ordering and
expression of contiguous sovereign territories, but rather in terms of parallel
cosmologies, laws, and jurisdictions.
II. COMMON LAW, CIVIL JURISPRUDENCE, AND MEETINGS OF LAW
In so far as questions of lawfulness continue to be important to those living
within a common law jurisdiction, questions about the meeting of laws also
remain significant—as does the concern with the sense of honor and shame with
which it is possible to live with law.19 A meeting of laws can be arranged in many
ways and with many degrees of engagement. It could be imagined as two people
meeting and acknowledging a lawful relation. Usually, it is more mediated. While
the repatriation of the Indigenous dead need not be understood in terms of law,
part of the challenge of Christine Black’s formulation of what is at issue in the
return of the dead is to offer an account of what it means to engage in lawful
relations from within the common law tradition in Australia.
To arrange the common law into a shape that meets another law requires
consideration of both the form and substance of the conduct of the meeting of
laws and of ways of belonging to law. At one level, the formal and ceremonial
arrangements of the meeting of laws are figured in the treaties, conventions, and
contracts between nations. Such legal forms create protocols of lawful
engagement that require acknowledgement of law and of status. However, as with
the protocols of “welcome to country,” the arrangements for the repatriation of
the Indigenous dead to their own law follow a pattern of relations where laws do
not, or do not quite, meet. In order to hold on to the difficulties of finding a
meeting place of laws within the common law tradition, attention is given here to
the jurisdictional form or practice of law. The elements of substantive law relating
to repatriation will also be recast in order to say something about the conduct of
the meeting of laws.
The contemporary regulation of repatriation is predominantly constructed in
relation to the authority and interests of the sovereign territorial state and of the
civil prudential concerns of security, civil peace, and the common wealth of the
population. For the most part, the care of the dead and of human remains is
treated institutionally as a matter of administration and welfare. This is so at both
a national and international level. At a national level, there is a range of legislation

17.
18.
19.

BLACK, supra note 12, at 107.
Morris, supra note 16, at 291.
See generally GAITA, supra note 8, at 87–106.
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that might deal with the repatriation and burial of the Indigenous dead.20 Much of
this regulation is shaped around legal concerns with ownership and possession.
These concerns are addressed through general laws relating to civil rights, private
property, and criminal law.
There is also a significant body of law relating to the protection of the
cultural heritage of Indigenous peoples and Torres Strait Islanders.21 This law
joins the repatriation of the Indigenous dead with a political concern regarding
cultural heritage and the self-determination of Indigenous peoples. It also
addresses the circulation and exchange of “cultural objects” by museums,
hospitals, and collectors. While given form in national legislation, this law of
“cultural heritage” forms a part with international conventions.22
Since 2007, the repatriation of the Indigenous dead has increasingly been
considered in the domain of rights. Article 12 of the UN Declaration of the Rights
of Indigenous Peoples (2007) has located the repatriation of the human remains of
the dead amongst a series of rights of Indigenous peoples to religion, ceremony,
privacy, and cultural artefacts.23 However, what is also important is that Article 12
is addressed to nation-states and directs them, in conjunction with Indigenous
peoples, to assist in the realisation of such rights. There is no direct statement of
the authority of an Indigenous law or jurisprudence. The repatriation of the
Indigenous dead to their own law or jurisdiction in Australia is, then, largely
addressed through the law of the Australian state.24
In order to draw out some of the ways in which Indigenous law and
common law might meet, and to frame the responsibilities of lawful conduct, it is
useful to step back from the “justice of repatriation” and return to a number of
jurisdictional practices that address a meeting of laws. While it is more usual to
think of jurisdiction as representing authority, there is a lot to be gained by
treating the arrangements of jurisdiction as authorising or creating and maintaining
relations of law. By attending to jurisdictional concerns, it is possible to make
20. Prue Vines, Resting in Peace? A Comparison of the Legal Control of Bodily Remains in Cemeteries
and Aboriginal Burial Grounds in Australia, 20 SYDNEY L. REV. 78, 100 (1998).
21. Commonwealth policy is shaped around the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Heritage
Protection Act 1984 (Cth) s 21 (Austl.), which assists the preservation and protection of places, areas
and objects of particular significance to “Indigenous Australians.” The States have a variety of
legislative regimes. See Protection Under State and Territory Laws, AUSTL. GOV’T: DEP’T ENV’T,
http://www.environment.gov.au/heritage/laws/indigenous/protection-laws.html (last visited Mar. 2,
2013).
22. Australia is a signatory to the United Nations Convention on the Protection and
Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expression, Oct. 20, 2005, 2440 U.N.T.S. 311, and the United
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007); see CRAIG FORREST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
PROTECTION OF CULTURAL HERITAGE 1–5 (2010).
23. G.A. Res. 61/295, supra note 22, at 6, 10 (relating to rights to lands, territories, and
resources).
24. Self-determination, too, is shaped around the continuing existence of the state-form and
interests of the state. See SUNDHYA PAHUJA, DECOLONISING INTERNATIONAL LAW:
DEVELOPMENT, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE POLITICS OF UNIVERSALITY 10–43 (2011).
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visible the ways in which the common law understands how laws meet and how
those who live with the common law conduct themselves in such a meeting. The
first, and most obvious, way in which jurisdictional thinking helps with this task is
that it is concerned with who speaks and how. Jurisdictional thinking joins
questions of authority to the mode and manner of the authorisation of laws. From
here, and this is a second feature of jurisdictional practice, it is possible to describe
(or redescribe) jurisdictional arrangements in terms of the crafting of repertoires
of lawful conduct—or of ways of belonging to law. (In the final part of this Essay,
it is suggested that, within the common law tradition, one of the more important
responsibilities of the office of the jurisprudent remains the care both for the
jurisdictional practices of law and for the dead.)
As already suggested, jurisdiction is treated here as a technology that is
concerned with the crafting of relations of law. This can be contrasted with the
way that jurisdiction is usually cast within discussions that give priority to
sovereignty. Viewed from the position of sovereign territorial states (and
international law), jurisdiction is typically related both to the exercise of
sovereignty as an attribute of the state and to the fact of the exercise of authority
over a (physical) territory or land. Sovereign control of the territory by the state
comes first; jurisdiction becomes a question of the rightful exercise of authority.
At a national level, jurisdiction is often limited to a procedural concern with the
exercise and administration of authority over a territory, dispute, person, or event.
In this account, territory and population are part of the facts of the exercise of a
jurisdiction. However, giving priority to jurisdiction as a practice of the
authorisation of lawful relations allows for the consideration of the way in which
relations of law are shaped through forms of conduct.25 A territorial jurisdiction is
one that authorises relations according to a practice of relating territorially. A
territorial jurisdiction binds people, space, and place to law, but it need not bind
land.26
The concern with the repatriation of the Indigenous dead expressed in this
Article has more to do with the realisation or crafting of lawful relations than with
the representation of right as rule or principle. While a concern with the exercise
of sovereign territorial jurisdiction takes place at some distance from the particular
arrangements of repatriation, if repatriation is to be understood as a movement of

25. DORSETT & MCVEIGH, supra note 6, at 25–29.
26. See, for example, Hannah Arendt’s formulation of territory in terms of a relationship
between individuals. Arendt argues that territory relates
to the space between individuals in a group whose members are bound to, and at the same
time separated and protected from, each other by all kinds of relationships, based on a
common language, religion, a common history, customs, and laws. Such relationships
become spatially manifest insofar as they themselves constitute the space wherein the
different members of a group relate to and have intercourse with each other.
HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF EVIL 262–63
(1963).
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the Indigenous dead from one law to another, then the crossings need to be
noted.
The law that arrived in Australia at the end of the eighteenth century with
the establishment of British sovereignty and colonial settlement belongs to the
common law tradition. Prior to the 1830s, the common law applied to settlers
because of their status as subjects. It did not apply to Indigenous Australians
precisely because they were not yet considered to be subjects. When it was
determined in 1836 that Aborigines were amenable to English law, the British
Crown effectively asserted territorial jurisdiction in a more modern sense: it
asserted authority over the whole population within the territory.27 From the
1830s onwards, it has been less easy to see either common law jurisdiction as a
specific mode and manner of creating lawful relations or the presence of other
Indigenous laws in relation to the common law. The juridical projects of the
nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Australia were shaped around the creation
of a single territorial jurisdiction in Australia.28
This is most obvious in the range of decisions that has developed the
doctrine of “native title”—the common law expression of its relation to the laws
of Aboriginal peoples. In a number of decisions from Mabo v Queensland (No. 2)
(1992) to Members of the Yorta Yorta Community v Victoria (2002), the High Court of
Australia established the forms of conduct of relations between the common law
of Australia and Indigenous laws.29 These cases, and the subsequent Native Title
Act 1993 (Cth), have had the effect of shaping how meetings between Indigenous
law and Australian common law are understood—and what a meeting place (such
as a court or a museum) might require by way of lawful conduct.30
In Mabo (No. 2), the High Court of Australia began its reconsideration of the
status of the continuing existence of Indigenous interests in land. These interests,
the High Court asserted, were founded in the relationship of Indigenous
Australians to their country and survived the annexation of the continent and the
establishment of sovereignty by Great Britain. Whilst the majority of the Court
held that native title was sourced in the laws, customs, and traditions of the
Meriam people (and formally, in later cases, Aboriginal peoples), it was unwilling
to acknowledge any contemporary authority of law or jurisdiction of the Meriam
people. The assertion of British sovereignty had the important consequence that,

27. R v Murrell (1836) 1 Legge 72 (Austl.). It did so as a matter of policy and government.
28. Shaunnagh Dorsett & Shaun McVeigh, Just So: “The Law Which Governs Australia Is
Australian Law,” 13 LAW & CRITIQUE 289, 293 (2002).
29. Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Cmty. v Victoria (2002) 194 ALR 538, 549–50 (Austl.);
Mabo v Queensland (No. 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1, 58–63 (Austl.). On the terminology of native title,
aboriginal title, and tribal law, see P.G. MCHUGH, ABORIGINAL TITLE: THE MODERN
JURISPRUDENCE OF TRIBAL LAND RIGHTS 1–24 (2011).
30. Justin B. Richland, Hopi Tradition as Jurisdiction: On the Potentializing Limits of Hopi Sovereignty,
36 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 201, 220–28 (2011).
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at the moment of acquisition, the common law became the law of the land. In this
account, sovereignty is coextensive with the modern state, and indivisible.31
In creating a category of law under the heading of “native title,” the decision
in Mabo (No. 2) created a relationship between two laws—those of the Meriam
people and that of the common law of the Australian state.32 It asked: under
whose laws did Eddie Mabo inherit? The precise juridical nature of this
relationship has proven hard to characterise. The doctrinal instantiation of
territorial state sovereignty as the language of legal authority was completed in the
case of Yorta Yorta.33 For the High Court, the form of the meeting of laws was to
be staged between two “normative systems”: Aboriginal laws and traditions, and
common law.34 However, as in Mabo (No. 2), in doing so, the High Court in Yorta
Yorta described the meeting only in terms of the sovereign-territorial authority of
the Australian state. For the High Court, the assertion of sovereignty by the
British Crown “necessarily entailed” that thereafter there could be “no parallel
law-making system in the territory over which it asserted sovereignty.”35 To hold
otherwise, it stated, “would be to deny the acquisition of sovereignty and . . . that
is not permissible.”36
Two ways of engaging the plurality of laws would seem to be possible for
Australian common law after Yorta Yorta. The first is that as a result of that
decision, after the assertion of British sovereignty, there is no Indigenous or
Aboriginal law as such, merely a “normative system” that is something less than
law. Such normative systems may be considered as custom or tradition, in which
case no meeting point between laws is possible. Or, second, Indigenous or
Aboriginal laws exist, but they run in parallel to the common law, and hence never
meet common laws unless a nonlegal meeting point is built between them. Such a
meeting point might, perhaps, be ethical, social, or governmental. Viewed from
the perspective of Australian “territorial sovereignty,” the repatriation of the
Indigenous dead cannot take place by means of a meeting of Indigenous and nonIndigenous laws.

31. For a comparative account of the meeting of “settler” and “indigenous” laws, see generally
KIRSTY GOVER, TRIBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM: STATES, TRIBES, AND THE GOVERNANCE OF
MEMBERSHIP (2010).
32. The following three paragraphs repeat a broader argument made in Shaunnagh Dorsett &
Shaun McVeigh, Conduct of Laws: Native Title, Responsibility, and Some Limits of Jurisdictional Thinking, 36
MELB. U. L. REV. 470, 475–79 (2012).
33. Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Cmty. 194 ALR at 550–52.
34. Id. at 548 (quoting from Fejo v NT of Austl. (1998) 195 CLR 96 (Austl.)).
35. Id. at 552.
36. Id.; see also ANN CURTHOYS ET AL., RIGHTS AND REDEMPTION: HISTORY, LAW AND
INDIGENOUS PEOPLE 60–80 (2008); Shaunnagh Dorsett & Shaun McVeigh, An Essay on Jurisdiction,
Jurisprudence, and Authority: The High Court of Australia in Yorta Yorta, 59 N. IR. LEGAL Q. 1, 9 (2005).
While the decisions in cases like Mabo ( No. 2) and Yorta Yorta are made from within the common law,
they are also consistent with the understanding of territorial sovereignty in International law. See
James Crawford, Sovereignty as a Legal Value, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL
LAW 117, 119–20 (James Crawford & Martti Koskenniemi eds., 2012).
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The decisions of the High Court of Australia and the formation of “native
title” law have been criticized in great detail.37 Here, a number of points can be
made about the meeting of laws in relation to repatriation. The most obvious of
these is that while “native title” marks a limit of the process of the colonization
and decolonization, the affirmation of the sovereign territorial state does not end
the meeting of laws.38 If attention is turned from what is often treated as the
territorial fact of sovereignty to the practice of jurisdiction, however, it becomes
possible to consider the “native title” cases and legislation in terms of the conduct
of a series of jurisdictional relationships. In this respect, the assertion of sovereign
territorial jurisdiction in the manner of Mabo (No. 2) or Yorta Yorta does not end
the meeting of laws: it sets conditions.39
While Mabo (No. 2), Yorta Yorta, and subsequent legislation have formed a
part of a reconsideration of the settlement of the continent of Australia, this
reconsideration has instituted a complex relation of meeting between laws. It is a
meeting that always takes place twice: once (retrospectively) at settlement and
then, subsequently, by way of the improvisation of parallel laws. In Mabo (No. 2),
Justice Brennan reformulated an old doctrine on the meeting of laws in order to
characterize the relation between Aboriginal law and common law. Brennan
stated:
Native Title has its origin in and is given its content by the traditional
laws acknowledged by and the traditional customs observed by the
indigenous inhabitants of a territory. The nature and incidents of native
title must be ascertained as a matter of fact by reference to those laws and
customs.40
What is of concern for the Court (and government agencies) is understood
in terms of an evidentiary inquiry: “Are you a rightful claimant?” “What customs
do you have?” In terms of the conduct of a meeting of laws, the predominance of
these questions engenders the more skeptical question: do you exist for our
purposes?41 The assertion of an Indigenous jurisdiction (and domain of rights and

37. See, e.g., PAST LAW, PRESENT HISTORIES (Diane Kirkby ed., 2012); Stewart Motha, The
Sovereign Event in a Nation’s Law, 13 LAW & CRITIQUE 311, 317–24 (2002). See generally BETWEEN
INDIGENOUS AND SETTLER GOVERNANCE (Lisa Ford & Tim Rowse eds., 2012); THE SOCIAL
EFFECTS OF NATIVE TITLE: RECOGNITION, TRANSLATION, COEXISTENCE (Benjamin R. Smith &
Frances Morphy eds., 2007).
38. Shaun McVeigh & Sundhya Pahuja, Rival Jurisdictions: The Promise and Loss of Sovereignty, in
AFTER SOVEREIGNTY: ON THE QUESTION OF POLITICAL BEGINNINGS 97, 104–10 (Charles
Barbour & George Pavlich eds., 2010).
39. See Shaunnagh Dorsett, Mapping Territories, in JURISPRUDENCE OF JURISDICTION 137,
153–56 (Shaun McVeigh ed., 2007).
40. Mabo v Queensland (No. 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1, 58 (Austl.).
41. Karolina Kuprecht, The Concept of “Cultural Affiliation” in NAGPRA: Its Potential and Limits
in the Global Protection of Indigenous Cultural Property Rights, 19 INT’L J. CULTURAL PROP. 33, 38–41
(2012); Peter Rush, Deathbound Doctrine: Scenes of Murder and Its Inheritance, 16 STUD. L. POL. & SOC’Y
71, 83–93 (1997).
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government) with the Australian Courts continues to be a contest of both
authority and form.42
The formulation of relations of law in terms of sovereign territorial states has
meant that it is hard to see the repatriation of the Indigenous dead as a part of the
honouring of the laws of Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples. However,
attending to the forms of jurisdictional practice allows for the analysis of other
forms of lawful conduct in the meeting of laws. In the next section, a number of
these jurisdictional practices are discussed to sharpen the jurisdictional
arrangements of repatriation. Without wishing away the authority of the state
assertion of sovereign territorial jurisdiction, jurisdictional practices can also be
understood on a smaller scale in the form of legal relations shaped by the
authority of an institution (a church, a university, or a museum, for example), the
practice of adjudication, the formation of a legal category (say, that of the person
or of a category like “ancestral remains”), or of a legal device. Jurisdictional
practices, even those that organise lawful relations territorially, can be understood
in terms of the forms of relationship they create and make available. In a like
manner, it is possible, even within forms of common law understanding, to frame
some meetings of law in terms of conduct rather than the proof of existence and
fact of practice.
III. REPATRIATIONS
In contemporary practices of the repatriation of the Indigenous dead in
Australia and elsewhere, it is the museum that has become the central office or
bearer of political, administrative, and cultural responsibility. In addition to being
institutions and sites of the display of the glory of the sovereign and “civic
laboratories” for new forms of citizenship, a significant number of museums have
now taken up the task of caring for the ancestral remains of the Indigenous
dead.43 How this new task might be understood, and whether it should be

42. Marcia Langton et al., Introduction to HONOUR AMONG NATIONS?: TREATIES AND
AGREEMENTS WITH INDIGENOUS PEOPLE 1, 1–3 (Marcia Langton et al. eds., 2004); Lisa Palmer &
Maureen Tehan, ‘Anchored to the Land’: Asserting and Recognising Aboriginal Jurisdiction in the Northwest
Territories, in SETTLING WITH INDIGENOUS PEOPLE: MODERN TREATY AND AGREEMENT-MAKING
66, 85–91 (Marcia Langton et al. eds., 2006).
43. Michael Pickering & Phil Gordon, Repatriation: The End of the Beginning, in
UNDERSTANDING MUSEUMS: AUSTRALIAN MUSEUMS AND MUSEOLOGY 1, 2–3 (Des Griffin &
Leon Paroissien eds., 2011), available at http://nma.gov.au/research/understanding-museums
/MPickering_PGordon_2011.html. The role was articulated in Museums Austl. Inc., Continuous
Cultures, Ongoing Responsibilities: Principles and Guidelines for Australian Museums Working with Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander Cultural Heritage, NAT’L MUSEUM AUSTL. 20 (Feb. 2005), http://www.nma
.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0020/3296/ccor_final_feb_05.pdf. See the National Museum of
Australia’s policy documents on repatriation: Repatriation, NAT’L MUSEUM AUSTL., http://www
.nma.gov.au/collections/repatriation (last visited Mar. 2, 2013). For an account of the civic project of
museums in Australia, see Tony Bennett, Civic Laboratories: Museums, Cultural Objecthood and the
Governance of the Social, 19 CULTURAL STUD. 521, 534–41 (2005).
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undertaken, has been the subject of intense debate.44 Museums have frequently
hesitated over the return of ancestral remains, not only citing a lack of legal
obligation to repatriate, but also expressing a number of competing or overriding
duties, interests, and rights. These claims have been made in the name of scientific
research, the obligations of civic education, and the curating or care of national or
universal cultures.45 These justifications and their forms of practice are not directly
at issue in this Essay. Or, rather, such concerns are directly at issue, but it is argued
here that they cannot be addressed without attending to the jurisdictional modes
of the authorisation of the conduct of lawful relations.
In many respects, the question of rival or competing interests in museum
practice has been decisively answered in Australia. The Australian Government, at
least, is clear that repatriation is part of its concern with remedying the injustices
of its “shared past.”46 Australian regulation has followed the United States in
developing an account of repatriation within domestic institutions that is based on
a presumption of repatriation where it is possible to do so.47 Rather than develop
regimes of civil rights, Australian regulation has addressed repatriation through
relations of cultural heritage and property.48 Designated museums undertake the
work of repatriation from Australian institutions and act as mediators in voluntary
repatriations of work from overseas institutions.49 These practices are set within a

44. Michael Pickering, Despatches from the Front Line? Museum Experiences in Applied Repatriation,
in THE LONG WAY HOME, supra note 11, at 163, 166–68; Paul Turnbull, The Vermilion Accord and the
Significance of the History of the Scientific Procurement and Use of Indigenous Australian Bodily Remains, in THE
LONG WAY HOME, supra note 11, at 117, 121–30.
45. Tatiana Flessas, The Repatriation Debate and the Discourse of the Commons, 17 SOC. & LEGAL
STUD. 387, 392–402 (2008).
46. The policy is captured in its opening statement: “The Australian Government is
committed to addressing the injustice of Australia’s shared past as it relates to the removal of ancestral
remains and secret sacred objects to empower Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples to meet
their cultural obligations and contribute to the wider Australian society.” Office of the Arts, Dep’t of
the Prime Minister & Cabinet, Australian Government Policy on Indigenous Repatriation, AUSTL. GOV’T 5
(Aug. 2013), http://arts.gov.au/sites/default/files/indigenous/repatriation/Repatriation%20Policy
_10%20Oct%202013.pdf.
47. The Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001–3013
(2012), and the National Museum of the American Indian Act, 20 U.S.C. § 80(q) (2012), shaped the
presumption of the repatriation of Indigenous dead (“cultural objects”) along the lines of civil rights,
property, culture, and public administration. See Jack F. Trope & Walter R. Echo-Hawk, The Native
American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act: Background and Legislative History, in THE FUTURE OF THE
PAST: ARCHAEOLOGISTS, NATIVE AMERICANS AND REPATRIATION 9, 22–31 (Tamara L. Bray ed.,
2001).
48. Maureen Tehan, To Be or Not to Be (Property): Anglo-Australian Law and the Search for Protection
of Indigenous Cultural Heritage, 15 U. TAS. L. REV. 267, 280–87 (1996); Nicole Watson, The Repatriation of
Indigenous Remains in the United States of America and Australia: A Comparative Analysis, 8 AUSTL.
INDIGENOUS L. REP. 33, 38–40 (2003); Marilyn C. Truscott, Repatriation of Indigenous Cultural Property,
AUSTL. GOV’T (2006), http://www.environment.gov.au/system/files/pages/e535aa20-601d-4e5f9279-5fe172d2b708/files/repatriation.pdf.
49. At the level of commonwealth government, the “Return of Indigenous Cultural Property
Program” covered these matters. Between 2001 and 2010, the program supported the return of more
than 1400 ancestral remains and 1380 secret sacred objects to Indigenous communities. Work has
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range of policy concerns running from the creation of spheres of Aboriginal selfdetermination and participation in government to urban and regional planning and
development.50
In order to draw out the sense of repatriation as being concerned with the
return of the Indigenous dead to their proper jurisdiction, it is necessary to recast
the diverse range of regulatory materials, museum practices, and justifications in
terms of the conduct of the meeting of laws. Despite the importance of the
languages of rights and responsibilities in relation to repatriation, what is striking is
how little attention is paid to the meeting and transmission of laws. Three
jurisdictional arrangements are addressed here: the first involves the status of the
Indigenous dead within the common law tradition; the second, the law of
inheritance and the burial; and the third, the jurisdictional arrangement for the
responsibility to care and speak for the dead. Historically, within Western legal
idioms, the concerns with the status of the dead and the authority to care and
speak for the dead all touch on the complex relations between church and state
and between spiritual and temporal jurisdictions. These are the jurisdictional
resources through which the Indigenous dead are given a place within the
common law tradition. As jurisdictional arrangements, they also shape the forms
of conduct made available for repatriation.
1. Plural Jurisdictions
One of the complexities of thinking jurisdictionally within the common law
tradition is that there is rarely a single point where jurisdictional practice is
securely bound to sovereign territory and its administration. The first division of
jurisdictions and of laws within European idioms was between common law (of
nations and peoples) and canon or church law. The jurisdictional arrangements of
common law and ecclesiastical law hold the shape of the distinction between the
forum of conscience (church or spiritual authority) and the external forum of
government (civil or temporal authority). Ecclesiastical jurisdictions and canon law
played an important part in the law of England during the Middle Ages. One
result of the English secession from the authority of Rome in the 1530s was the
formation of the Church of England and the transformation of canon law into
English ecclesiastical law. The canon law courts were incorporated into the

also been done to identify the origins of other ancestral remains and secret sacred objects held in the
collections of these museums. This resulted in the identification, to community level, of over 1000
ancestral remains and over 3000 secret sacred objects. See generally Department of the Environment, Water,
Heritage and the Arts Annual Report 2009-10, AUSTL. GOV’T: DEP’T ENV’T, http://www
.environment.gov.au/resource/department-environment-water-heritage-and-arts-annual-report-200910 (last visited Feb. 13, 2014).
50. See generally DAVID EDELMAN ET AL., NAT’L NATIVE TITLE TRIBUNAL,
COMMONWEALTH, STATE AND TERRITORY HERITAGE REGIMES: SUMMARY OF PROVISIONS FOR
ABORIGINAL CONSULTATION (Lincoln Hayes & Kathryn Neville eds., 2010); ELOISE SCHNIERER,
NEW S. WALES ABORIGINAL LAND COUNCIL, CARING FOR CULTURE (2010).
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framework of English national courts and into the framework of English law
itself. Much was changed in the translation of canon law into a national law.51
One problem for those who address the repatriation of the Indigenous dead
through the common law is that the common law does not always care for its own
dead. The reasons for this are varied. However, in matters of repatriation of the
Indigenous dead, the statement of law that there can be no property in the dead
has been used to explain why museums have no legal obligation to repatriate the
Indigenous dead. If there can be no property in the dead, there can be no
common law duty to return stolen property. As a consequence, any claim for the
return of the human remains was treated as a “moral” claim rather than an
enforceable legal claim. Within the common law, this is a proposition that is traced
either to a decision of Edward Coke in 1613 in Haynes’s Case (1614)52—although, it
is questionable whether Coke ever determined in Haynes’s Case that there could be
no property in a dead body—or to Coke’s The Third Part of the Institutes of the Laws
of England (Third Institute) (1644)—“the buriall [sic] of the cadaver (that is caro data
vermibus) is nullius in bonis, and belongs to ecclefiafticall [sic] cognifance [sic], but as
to the monument, action is given . . . at the common law for defacing thereof.”53
Coke’s argument in the Third Institute suggests something other than a property
right is at issue in the care of the dead. The Third Institute does not say that a
cadaver does not belong to law, or even that it could not be bound to the
common law. Rather, it says that, in the matter of burial, the body belongs or is
bound to another law—ecclesiastical law. In Haynes’s Case and the Third Institute,
the dead body itself was not at issue.54
The way in which the common law declined jurisdiction over burial in the
seventeenth century has become more problematic with the decline of the
significance of an ecclesiastical jurisdiction. The consequence of the failure to bind
the body to the common law, the way in which precedent transmits law across
time, and the effective demise of noncommon law jurisdictions has been to leave
the dead body without jurisdictional place. Of course, it is possible within
Australian law to treat the body as property or being owned. The heritage
legislation for the state of Victoria in Australia does something like this, declaring
that Aboriginal people who can show a traditional or familial link to Aboriginal

51. PETER GOODRICH, LANGUAGES OF LAW: FROM LOGICS OF MEMORY TO NOMADIC
MASKS 53–110 (1990).
52. Haynes’s Case, (1614) 77 Eng. Rep. 1389, (H.C.) 1389.
53. EDWARDO COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND:
CONCERNING HIGH TREASON AND OTHER PLEAS OF THE CROWN, AND CRIMINAL CAUSES 203
(London, W. Clarke & Sons 1817) (1644). This principle has been affirmed in R v. Lynn, (1787) 168
Eng. Rep. 350 (K.B.) 351. See also Doodeward v Spence (1908) 6 CLR 406, 411–14 (Austl.); In re Organ
Retention Grp. Litig., [2004] EWHC (QB) 644, [2005] 2 W.L.R. 358 [390]–[93] (Eng.).
54. See Yan Thomas, Res Religiosae: On the Categories of Religion and Commerce in Roman Law, in
LAW, ANTHROPOLOGY, AND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE SOCIAL: MAKING PERSONS AND
THINGS 40 (Alain Pottage & Martha Mundy eds., 2004).
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human remains become the owners of the human remains.55 Where Aboriginal
human remains are held by state institutions, they are to be handed over to the
relevant museum’s board with a view to returning the remains or keeping them as
custodian.56
Haynes’s Case struggled with what can be held within a jurisdiction or what
can happen when what were two distinct jurisdictions become joined. Following,
or developing, a line of argument about the meeting of laws requires a sense of the
way in which the transmission of law is also an engagement of the institution and
address of law. The inheritors of the decision in Haynes’s Case lost the mode and
meaning of what is bound to law. A failure to attend to this has meant that the
dead of the common law and the Indigenous dead brought into the sphere of
authority of the common law have come to be treated without care or reason.
They are not patterned into the ordering of forms of life and death and the
relations of the living, the dead, and the yet to be born, as they were within an
ecclesiastical jurisdiction of conscience.
The dead and the practice of repatriation as questions of property lose the
sense in which repatriation is concerned with a meeting of laws. In the alignment
of the care of the dead with property relations, a museum, for example, charged
with the care of the dead can only conduct itself as a matter of statutory authority,
administration, and policy. An Aboriginal person can be recognised as an owner
under Australian law, but not directly as someone with responsibilities and rights
under Aboriginal law. (The Aboriginal Heritage Act 2006 (Vic) does not mention
Aboriginal or Indigenous law at all.) At the level of the description of policy and
activity, the lack of reference to another law may not matter. Contemporary
juridical forms generally work with a very small repertoire of ceremonial
engagements. However, what might be lost for those living within the common
law tradition is the ability to formulate a relationship of lawful conduct, either of
conscience or government. A further sense of this can be gained from another
vestige of ecclesiastical ordering: the laws of inheritance.
2. Inheritance and Placement
Although the narrative of the movement and placement of the Indigenous
dead lies at the centre of repatriation, relatively few attempt to give shape to the
forms of conduct appropriate to repatriation itself. In the United Kingdom, for
example, the concern for repatriation is addressed in the Human Tissue Act 2004
(UK). There, repatriation is considered as a matter of the treatment and care of
human remains in hospitals, museums, and other public institutions. Museum
policy in Australia, however, operates both with an account of human or ancestral
remains and, increasingly, an account of the return of the Indigenous dead. While
the language of rights and self-determination are capable of giving a general sense
55.
56.

Aboriginal Heritage Act 2006 (Vic) s 13 para 1 (Austl.).
Id. at s 15.
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of political responsibility, something else is needed to articulate the sense of caring
lawfully for the Indigenous dead. Within the common law, the care of the dead
has been treated as of inheritance and burial.
One example of the treatment of the return of the Indigenous dead as a
concern of proper inheritance can be found in the Tasmanian case of In re
Tasmanian Aboriginal Centre Inc. (2007).57 This case was initiated by the Tasmanian
Aboriginal Centre (TAC) as part of its political work to secure the return to
Tasmania of those Indigenous dead held in museums in England and Scotland.
The application to the Tasmanian Supreme Court was sought in order to make the
TAC an administrator of the estates of the seventeen dead Aboriginal Tasmanians
whose remains were being held in the Natural History Museum in London. As an
administrator, the TAC was given the responsibility to secure the inheritance of
any possible descendants of the dead Aboriginal men and to bury the dead men
according to “customary [Indigenous] law.”58 Most interesting from the viewpoint
of the meetings of laws is that by making the Indigenous dead a concern of
inheritance and burial, rather than heritage and property, the Indigenous dead
come to be treated as dead and in a relationship with the living and the yet to be
born. However, the cost of such acknowledgement is that inheritance and burial
must take place as a matter of Australian law.
A related jurisdictional ordering can be seen in the arrangements where there
is a dispute of law and ceremony in the burial of the dead. As in Haynes’s Case
(1610), the concern is one of authority and care. However, in this situation, the
question of jurisdictional arrangement was not posed in terms of a relation
between common law and ecclesiastical law, but between two common laws. In
the New Zealand case of Takamore v Clarke (2011), a dispute arose over burial
place and burial rites of James Takamore.59 The question arose as to whether he
should be buried according to the wishes of James Takamore’s wife, who was also
the executrix of his will, or according to the wishes of the family of his birth. Mr.
Takamore was of Whakatohea and Tuhoe decent. His family marae at Kutarere
observes the tikanga (law) of Tuhoe. Mrs. Clarke and her children wished for Mr.
Takamore to be buried near them. The question of proper burial was raised both
as one of the authority of the common law of New Zealand and of its relationship
to Maori laws. While the tikanga of Tuhoe was recognised as “customary” law, the
different common law courts that heard this case held different views as to its
status. The High Court, the Court of Appeal, and Supreme Court all held that the

57. In re Tasmanian Aboriginal Centre Inc. ( Tas) (2007) 16 Tas R 139, 141 (Austl.).
58. Id. at 143. For a fuller account, see generally Chris Davies & Kate Galloway, The Story of
Seventeen Tasmanians: The Tasmanian Aboriginal Centre and Repatriation from the National History Museum, 11
NEWCASTLE L. REV. 143 (2009).
59. Clarke v Takamore [2010] 2 NZLR 525 (HC) (N.Z.); Takamore v Clarke [2011] NZCA 587
(N.Z.); Takamore v Clarke [2012] NZSC 116 (N.Z.). The Australian law is briefly illustrated in Jones v
Dodd (1999) 73 SASR 328, 333–35 (Austl.); Jones v Dodd [1999] SASC 125 (Austl.); and Dodd v Jones
[1999] SASC 458 at paras [29]–[32] (Austl.).
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tikanga relating to burial could not be recognised as consistent with the common
law.60 What is extraordinary in this case is that the two laws are related not to the
present situation in New Zealand, but to the relation between the common law of
England and the common law of Ireland. The majority of the Court of Appeal
returned to the Case of Tanistry (1608) in order to develop a test of the recognition
of custom based on repugnancy.61 More recently, the majority of the Supreme
Court returned the question of the authority to order a burial to that of the role of
the office of executor and the inherent jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to
decide questions of burial where disputes are irresolvable or resolved
unreasonably.62 With this, the question of the meeting of laws is returned to any
array of concerns of judicial and administrative office within the common law of
New Zealand.
From its own viewpoint, the common law of Australia and New Zealand is
conducted and organized through forms of territorial jurisdiction. From this
standpoint, the shadow of older personal, ecclesiastical, and rival common law
jurisdictions is mainly of historical interest. However, such a jurisdictional
arrangement also points to the continuing effects of rival forms of jurisdictional
ordering.
3. Museums
By holding on to the meeting of laws as a jurisdictional arrangement of
conduct, it is possible to open up two lines of observation about the status and
authority of museums in the conduct of repatriation of the Indigenous dead. The
first, in a sense, is obvious. The development of museum policy addresses the
concerns of repatriation through the aspirations of the UN Declaration of the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples. It acknowledges the centrality of Indigenous selfdetermination and proposes a practice of consultation that differs considerably
from, and, in part, resists the jurisdictional forms of lawful relations incorporated
within, Australian common law. The way such understandings are related to the
forms of the conduct of law and administration is left as a matter of politics and
negotiation. However, as the analysis presented here suggests, such domains of
rights and administration do continue to be conducted through long established
jurisdictional practices. This becomes a matter of acute difficulty when
jurisdictional techniques used to develop practices of colonial administration are

60. Takamore v Clarke [2011] NZCA 587 (CA) at paras [163]–[165]; Clarke v Takamore [2010] 2
NZLR 525 (HC) at paras [86]–[88].
61. See Takamore v Clarke, [2011] NZCA 587 at paras [109]–[110] (drawing from Le Case de
Tanistry, (1608) 80 Eng. Rep. 516 (K.B.) 524 (unofficial translation from Law French)); Shaunnagh
Dorsett, ‘Since Time Immemorial’: A Story of Common Law Jurisdiction, Native Title and the Case of Tanistry, 26
MELB. U. L. REV. 32, 49–50 (2002).
62. Takamore v Clarke [2012] NZSC 116 (SC) at paras [90]–[95], [152]–[155]. It is worth noting
Elias CJ’s acknowledgement of the importance of the obligations to the dead and the yet to be born
for those who are guided by the tikanga of Tuhoe. Id. at para [97].
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turned to those of transitional justice or when the museum acts as a custodian of
either a universal heritage or of the Indigenous dead. For some, withdrawing from
the project of promoting national or world culture marks a loss of authority for
museums.63 However, at least in Australia and New Zealand, it might be the case
that museums are taking up new roles and responsibilities.
The second observation is more speculative. Museums have been directly
charged with the responsibility for mediating the repatriation of the Indigenous
dead. In doing so, they exercise a distinct authority. To consider the museum a
jurisdictional entity also invites consideration of the basis of that authority and
how it might be understood within the array of jurisdictional arrangements that
are represented in the montage of law.64 In this section, the jurisdiction of the
museum has been aligned with that of the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of
conscience—although it has been pointed out that it is a jurisdiction that does not
know its own craft of conducting lawful relations. For such a jurisdiction to be
established, it would have to take responsibility for the dead rather than care for
human remains. Against this, legislation such as the Aboriginal Heritage Act 2006
or the Australian policy on museums and repatriation prefers to present
repatriation as a matter of government and civil authority.65 In neither account is it
clear that the legal ordering will permit a meeting of laws.
Before leaving the museum, the last account of the conduct of meeting must
address the right to “speak for country” and to conduct the proper ceremonies of
the dead.66 A plurality of legislative arrangements for the representation of
Aboriginal elders has developed in the government of cultural heritage and the
repatriation of human remains.67 Such forms of consultation are important in the
work of the repatriation since they establish an institutional form that both attends
to the care of the Indigenous dead and provides for their return to their own law.
However, whether museums will take up a jurisdiction and accept responsibility
for the meeting of laws remains in dispute.
IV. ETHIC OF RESPONSIBILITY
The account of the meeting of laws in repatriation offered here has been

63. This is argued by Jenkins, cited above. JENKINS, supra note 10, at 26.
64. DORSETT & MCVEIGH, supra note 6; Peter Goodrich, Visive Powers: Colours, Trees and
Genres of Jurisdiction, 2 L. & HUMAN. 213, 221–23 (2008).
65. TONY BENNETT, PASTS BEYOND MEMORY: EVOLUTION, MUSEUMS, COLONIALISM
136–59 (2004).
66. Outside of museums, the acknowledgement of the right to “speak for country” and to
uphold Indigenous law is limited to general Australian law or rights exercised in relation to the
exercise of Native Title rights and interests. For example, the native title “right to maintain and
protect” burial sites is notoriously limited. See Neowarra v Western Australia [2003] FCA 1402, 132–35
(Austl.).
67. See, for example, the Advisory Committee for Indigenous Repatriation formed in 2012.
Indigenous Repatriation, AUSTL. GOV’T, http://arts.gov.au/indigenous/repatriation (last visited Mar. 2,
2013).
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limited and, in many respects, unhappy. The final part of this Article returns
questions of jurisprudence and jurisdiction to the office of the jurisprudent—the
institutional figure who takes responsibility for the conduct of law. Focusing on
the office here draws out the institutional (rather than directly existential) quality
of the conduct of repatriation in the meeting of laws.68
The analysis of the meeting of laws presented in this Article has followed a
number of ways in which Indigenous and non-Indigenous laws meet without
necessarily coming into close relation. At its centre is an account of lawful
relations that follows the contours of a civil jurisprudence ordered around
sovereign territorial authority, civil peace, and the welfare of the population. The
social task of this jurisprudence rests on security and limited sociability.69
The contemporary formulation of repatriation in Australian museums
responds to a somewhat different account of the conduct of the meeting of laws.
In this account, common law and Indigenous law are in relation. This returns
repatriation to the more general conditions of the conduct of lawful relations. The
works of the Canadian jurisprudents Jeremy Webber and Mark Walters draw
attention to the ways in which both Indigenous law and common law would have
to be drawn in relation for such accounts to establish a meaningful meeting of
laws.
For Webber and Walters, the prospect of a meeting of law and of the
possibility of justice depends on the realisation of the customary character of both
common law and Indigenous law. It also depends on developing an awareness of
the “intersubjective” quality of lawful relations, as well as of the importance of
negotiating between laws.70 For Webber, this requires both the work of comparing
law and the political insistence on a common horizon of justice.71 For Walters, the
task of engaging the meeting of laws is bound up with reconciliation.
Reconciliation itself is the “unwritten” principle of legality.72 Here, both
Indigenous and non-Indigenous law in Canada is joined in the realisation and
maintenance of “social harmony, political coordination, and rational
deliberation.”73 The work of repatriation, then, might be given shape in finding a
common language of law and custom that relates the importance of the burial of
the dead to the conduct of lawful relations.74

68. CONAL CONDREN, ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITY IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND: THE
PRESUPPOSITION OF OATHS AND OFFICES (2006); Jeffrey Minson, Holding On to Office, in THE
PRINCE’S NEW CLOTHES: WHY DO AUSTRALIANS DISLIKE THEIR POLITICIANS? 127, 134–37
(David Burchell & Andrew Leigh eds., 2002).
69. PAHUJA, supra note 24, at 44–94.
70. Jeremy Webber, The Grammar of Customary Law, 54 MCGILL L. J. 579, 589 (2009).
71. Id. at 623–25.
72. Mark D. Walters, The Jurisprudence of Reconciliation: Aboriginal Rights in Canada, in THE
POLITICS OF RECONCILIATION IN MULTICULTURAL SOCIETIES 165, 188–89 (Will Kymlicka &
Bashir Bashir eds., 2008).
73. Id.
74. This is also the task articulated by Museums Australia in its recommendation of museum
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Whether or not entering into and reconciling customary relations is possible
or convincing depends on whether the common law tradition has a sufficiently
meaningful account of jurisdiction, conduct, and experience to sustain the lawful
relations required in the meeting of laws. The Australian jurisprudent Peter Rush
has pointed out that much of the concern of common judges and jurists is
directed towards the quality of the common law rather than reconciliation. What is
the way in the possibility of lawful relations is tied to the experience of law. In
Rush’s reading of the common law, the experience of the common law in
Australia is one of anxiety and trauma.75 The trauma of the common law—as the
judgments in Mabo (No. 2) make plain—relates to the loss of tradition.76 For Rush,
the ethic of the office of the jurisprudent is not directly concerned with the
meeting of laws. It is concerned with care for the conduct of law that is brought to
the meeting. Where Webber’s ethic takes shape in intersubjective relations, Rush’s
ethic of office engages the responsibility of the jurist to create and maintain some
form of “interiority” to law—an interiority or experience of law adequate to
sustain conscience and judgment.77 It is an ethic of responsibility that is framed in
terms of finding the appropriate internal qualities to meet external realities.78 To
this has been added a concern with the technical forms of jurisdictional practice
by which lawful relations of the common law tradition are conducted.
CONCLUSION
From the viewpoint of those who follow the common law, I have argued
that the conduct of the meeting of laws is shaped by the repertoires of
jurisdictional practice and that the meeting of laws is also a practice of lawful
conduct or jurisprudence. In considering the responsibilities for the dead, the
living, and the yet to be born expressed within Indigenous jurisprudences,
Christine Black has emphasised the ways in which law is authorised through
experience and through the actualisation of relations. In response, I have argued
that it is through a jurisprudence of jurisdiction that the common law comes
closest to offering an account of the conduct of lawful relations. Insofar as a
jurisprudence of jurisdiction presented in this Article also carries with it a teaching
about how to conduct oneself in relation to law, this Article has pointed to some
of the ways in which the jurisprudence of the common law has responded to

practice. Museums Austl. Inc., supra note 43, at 6–10. The recommendations emphasize:
custodianship rather than ownership; recognition of the value of stories; acknowledgement of
Indigenous cultural practices; and creation of genuine relationships of reciprocity. Id.
75. Peter Rush, An Altered Jurisdiction: Corporeal Traces of Law, 6 GRIFFITH L. REV. 144, 149
(1998).
76. Dorsett & McVeigh, supra note 28, at 289.
77. Rush, supra note 75, at 147; see Rush, supra note 41, at 71–99.
78. See Peter D. Rush, Dirty War Crimes: Jurisdictions of Memory and International Criminal Law, in
THE HIDDEN HISTORIES OF WAR CRIMES TRIALS 367 (Kevin Jon Heller & Gerry Simpson eds.,
2013); MAX WEBER, Politics as a Vocation, in THE VOCATION LECTURES 32, 82–84 (David Owen &
Tracy B. Strong eds., Rodney Livingstone trans., 2004).
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Indigenous laws and jurisprudence through the creation and maintenance of the
repertoires of meeting. Doing so allows for the consideration of the particular
ways in which the jurisprudences of jurisdiction have contributed to the creation
of a meeting of laws in a lawful rather than a lawless way. It has also enabled the
practice of the meeting of laws and the repatriation of the Indigenous dead to be
addressed in terms of the honoring or dishonoring of laws.79
This Article closes with two accounts of repatriation. The first account is
taken from the return of Maori Ancestral remains from the Field Museum in
Chicago, United States, to the Te Papa Museum in Wellington, New Zealand.80
The repatriation was accompanied by representatives of Menominee Nation and
involved a reciprocal gift to the Field Museum. This might be taken as part of the
conduct of a heritage practice or, more powerfully, as the exercise of an
Indigenous international law—a movement of the dead from one law to another.
The second account, already addressed earlier, is taken from the recent
repatriations of the Indigenous dead from the museums and institutions of the
United Kingdom to Australia. What I want to note here is the ceremonial
character of the return of the Indigenous dead from museums in the United
Kingdom to Tasmania. There were two significant ceremonies: the passing of the
remains from the British Museums to the representatives of TAC in London, and
then the passing of the Indigenous dead from the representatives to the TAC.81
The conduct of an Indigenous international (or better, transnational) law and the
ceremonial meeting of laws might be taken as one of the ordering and of the limit
of the meeting of one jurisdiction with another. The question of the ceremony and
burial is returned to an Indigenous jurisdiction.82
While these are images of the practice of repatriation, they are not images of
the redemption of the common law so much as shadows of its practice. What is
required for those who live their lives through the common law tradition is to give
place to the dead.

79. Christine Black, Maturing Australia Through Australian Aboriginal Narrative Law, 110 S.
ATLANTIC Q. 347, 358 (2011).
80. International Repatriations, MUSEUM N.Z., http://www.tepapa.govt.nz/AboutUs/Repatriation
/Pages/InternationalRepatriations.aspx (last visited Mar. 2, 2013).
81. See PM with Mark Colvin: Ancestral Aboriginal Remains Arrive in Hobart (Austl. Broad. Corp.
News radio broadcast May 14, 2007) (transcript) (on file with UC Irvine Law Review), available at
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2007-05-14/ancestral-aboriginal-remains-arrive-in-hobart/2548730;
Aboriginal Remains Row (Austl. Broad. Corp. News television broadcast Feb. 21, 2007) (transcript) (on
file with the UC Irvine Law Review), available at http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2007
/s1853611.htm.
82. See, e.g., Christopher Wilson, Ngarrindjeri Experiences of Repatriation: Engaging in an Effective
Consultation Process for Returning Old People, 6 INDIGENOUS L. BULL. 16, 17 (2007).
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